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THE DIRECTOR OF CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE

WASHINGTON, D. C. 20505

National Intelligence Officers

NFAC-1397-80/1 26 February 1980

MEMORANDUM FOR: See Distribution	
FROM : National Intelligence Officer for Latin America	
SUBJECT : Monthly Warning Assessment: Latin America	25 X 1
1. Attached is a copy of the Latin America Warning Assessment based upon our discussion of 20 February 1980.	25X1
2. The next warning meeting will be held on 19 March 1980 at 1100 hours in room 5G00 at CIA headquarters. Please call by noon on 18 March to give her the name of the individual participating from your office.	25X1 25X1 25X1
Att: (1)	
	25X1

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THE DIRECTOR OF CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE

WASHINGTON, D. C. 20505

National Intelligence Officers

Approved Car Bull

NFAC-1397-80 26 February 1980

MEMORANDUM FOR:	Director of Central Intelligence Deputy Director of Central Intelligence	
THROUGH :	Deputy Director for National Foreign Assessment National Intelligence Officer for Warning	
FROM :	National Intelligence Officer for Latin America	0.577
	Monthly Warning Assessment: Latin America	25X1
	·	
1. Action	Requested: None; for your information only.	25X1
	eting of 20 February concentrated on the situation	
in El Salvador.		25X1
the present mil	rticipants were largely agreed that the outlook for itary-civilian junta was very poor. Infusion of US gn assistance to the junta would not necessarily lead ctiveness, because of splits on policy goals and tactics ng economic, political, and security environment.	25X1
government of t prospects for s of purpose amon high degree of might bring a g or more), such supplement its external assist believed the go	articipants judged that the advent of a military the right could come at any time. The short-term such a government would depend on the degree of unity of military and security force leaders. If there is a unity, a crackdown on the forces of the extreme left greater measure of order. Over the longer term (a year a government would need a political game plan to security measures. And it will probably need considerable tance. Even with such assistance, most participants overnment would eventually be overwhelmed by forces on	
the extreme le	ft	25X1
and policies o	participants hesitated to speculate about the character f a revolutionary leftist government in El Salvador. nts expressed a belief that there would be a competition between Marxist guerrilla leaders and more pragmatic	
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revolutionary leaders. A prolonged and bloody civil war was thought likely to increase the chances of Marxist dominance, which were already judged to be high.

25X1

Jack Davis

NFAC-1397-80

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